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Abstract
We consider a closed economy where a risk neutral bank competes with
a competitive bond market. Firms can finance a risky project either by
a bank credit or by issuing a bond which is directly sold to risk averse
investors who also hold safe deposits at the bank. We show that the bank
tends to allocate more capital to lower quality projects but there are some
interesting qualifications. If the asymmetric information concerns only the
success probability, then we observe adverse selection while if it concerns
only the expected return, bad types are driven out of the market.
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1 Introduction
Corporations have to rely on external financing whenever internal cash flows are
too small to finance new projects. The largest fraction of external financing by
U.S. nonfinancial corporations comes from debt, while net equity issues are mostly
negative.1 The starting point of our paper is a striking observation concerning
the corporate debt structure in the presence of private (bank) and public debt
markets (bonds). There is significant empirical evidence of the fact that bad
risks are predominantly financed by banks while good risks obtain most of their
funds from public debt markets. An early study by James (1987) shows that
firms announcing new bank loans and privately placed debt have a higher default
risk and are on average smaller than those announcing publicly placed straight
debt offerings. In an analysis of corporate financing in Japan, Hoshi et al. (1993)
find that high net worth firms are more likely to use public than bank debt.
Johnson (1997) presents evidence of the fact that the proportion of bank debt
is negatively related to firm size and age and positively related to leverage and
to earnings growth volatility. All these characteristics can serve as proxies for
credit risk: Small and young firms as well as highly leveraged firms or firms with
high earnings growth volatility can generally be considered more risky than firms
with the opposite characteristics. Similar results for more general private debt
are reported in Krishnaswami, Spindt, and Subramaniam (1999). Finally, the
tremendous growth of the market for credit derivatives in the last decade can
also be viewed as evidence for the risk accumulation by banks.2
The theoretical literature that provides explanations for the observed debt
structure of firms is large and too extensive to be reviewed in detail. Hence, we
only give a brief overview over the proposed explanations and contrast them with
the contribution of this paper. The literature mainly focusses on three aspects
that can explain the choice between bank loans and public debt, namely infor-
mation costs, monitoring and renegotiation. The information cost aspect was
1See the Flow of Funds Account of the Federal Reserve System, March 9, 2006, Table F.102.
2Banks and other financial institutions are the main participants in the credit derivatives
market, which according to the Credit Derivatives Report 2003/2004 of the British Bankers’
Association grew from $180 billion in 1997 to about $5,000 billion in 2004 and is expected to
exceed $8,000 billion in 2006.
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stressed by Fama (1985) who pointed out that the issue of public debt requires
the provision of information for a large group of potential debt holders (via bond
ratings or audits) while there is only one contracting party in case of a bank
loan. Fama (1985) concluded that the information cost for public debt financ-
ing is higher for smaller than for larger firms, so that small firms prefer bank
loans while large firms prefer public debt. This prediction is consistent with the
empirical evidence in James (1987) and Johnson (1997). In the sequel several
authors have pointed out that a bank loan involves close monitoring of the fi-
nanced project which is not the case for publicly traded debt. Several papers
take this monitoring activity to be the defining characteristic of a bank. Since
monitoring is costly bank loans are more expensive than public debt and hence
only those firms rely on bank credit which require monitoring. These can be firms
that have not built up a reputation of repaying their debt as in Diamond (1991)
or firms that are highly leveraged so that the market does not expect them to
behave diligently if they are not monitored as in Holmstrom and Tirole (1997).
These predictions are consistent with the empirical observation that firms an-
nouncing new bank loans have a higher default risk (James, 1987) and have a
higher leverage (Johnson, 1997) than firms announcing the issue of public debt.
Finally, it is much easier to renegotiate a bank loan than publicly traded debt
since the holders of public debt are typically widely dispersed while a bank loan
only involves one contracting partner. Debt renegotiation can prevent inefficient
liquidation and hence firms with a high probability of financial distress prefer
bank loans over bonds (see Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 1994, and Bolton and
Freixas, 2000). This prediction is consistent with the observation that bank debt
is increasing in the earnings growth volatility (see Johnson, 1997). Also, as Ra-
jan (1992) argues, debt renegotiation is costly since banks gain bargaining power
over the firm’s profits once projects have begun. He concludes that firms with
high quality (=high success probability) projects will prefer public debt while
those with low quality projects prefer bank loans, which is consistent with the
empirical evidence in James (1987).
The contribution of our paper is to offer an alternative and to some extent
much simpler answer to the old question, why banks tend to allocate more cap-
ital to riskier or more general lower quality projects. Our emphasis is on the
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role of banks in diversifying risks. While the previous literature has focussed on
a risk neutral world, where there is an infinitely elastic supply of funds at an
exogenously given interest rate, we take the view that risk aversion is a predom-
inant phenomenon, which has to be taken into account in any full model of bank
and capital market lending. We will show that the investors’ risk aversion alone
together with the bank’s ability to diversify risk can explain the debt allocation
between banks and bond markets.
In order to derive the implications of a bank’s risk diversification activity
we disregard the monitoring role of banks and choose a setting with asymmetric
information prior to contracting (firms have a given project type prior to contract-
ing). In our model a monopolistic bank faces competition from a bond market
which limits the rent extraction of the bank. Hence we combine a principal-agent
situation with a competitive market.3 Risk neutral firms seek finance for projects
and can obtain credit from the bank or issue bonds. There are two types of firms
which differ in the quality of their project. Only the proportions of the two types
of firms are common knowledge while the type of a single firm is its private in-
formation. Following Hellmann and Stiglitz (2000) we measure project quality
along two dimensions, namely the expected return and the success probability
of a project. Risk averse investors can invest their capital in safe bank deposits
or in risky bonds. Investment in bonds is risky because by assumption investors
cannot diversify their risk at the bond market. This assumption can be justified
by the fact that building a well diversified fund of bonds is too costly for individ-
ual investors. By contrast the bank can diversify its risk by giving loans to a pool
of firms. The bank sets the credit volume and the interest rates on deposits and
credit such as to maximize expected profits. In doing so it anticipates the equilib-
rium on the bond market. The firms in our model have no financial resources and
there is no equity market. Hence, collateral cannot serve as a screening device
and the bank can only screen the firms by setting the interest rate so high that
one firm type does not invest at all. In this case we say that the economy is in
3There is some empirical evidence of monopoly power at the level of individual banks (see
Cosimano and McDonald, 1998). However, it turns out that the results in our paper are not
driven by the monopoly power of the bank. Similar qualitative results can be obtained for an
oligopolistic banking sector (see section 3.1).
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a “screening equilibrium,” while a “pooling equilibrium” refers to the case where
both types of firms invest.
Different from most models on direct versus intermediated finance4 we find
that generically there is a mix of financing source in equilibrium, i.e. firms obtain
finance from the bank as well as by issuing bonds. This prediction is confirmed
by several empirical studies (see, for example, Houston and James, 1996, and
Johnson, 1997). Moreover, our model can explain the stylized fact that bad risks
receive more finance from the bank relative to the bond market than good risks.
The reason is that in the presence of a riskless deposit contract, which is offered
by the bank, the investors’ demand for bonds increases with the expected return
and decreases with the default risk of the bonds. In equilibrium the credit volume
is equal to the capital required by the firms in excess over what they obtain on the
bond market. Hence, the credit volume is decreasing in the expected return and
increasing in the default risk. The latter result is consistent with the observation
that the proportion of bank debt is increasing in credit risk (see, for example,
James, 1987 and Johnson, 1997).5
In addition we obtain interesting results concerning the nature of the equilib-
rium (pooling or screening). If firms only differ in the success probability of their
projects our model predicts that there will be a pooling equilibrium, whenever the
proportion of high risk projects in the economy is small, and a screening equilib-
rium, whenever the proportion is large. In the latter case the low risks are driven
out of the market. This is the classic adverse selection effect. If, on the contrary,
firms only differ in the expected return of their projects, then there is pooling
for small proportions of the “good” project (high expected return) while there is
screening if its proportion in the economy is large. If there is screening we observe
a positive selection effect, meaning that the low return project is driven out of the
market. These results are very intuitive: If the proportion of firms that are able
to pay a high interest rate on credit gets sufficiently large, it is optimal for the
bank to violate the participation constraint for the firms with a low willingness
to pay, i.e. we have a screening equilibrium. Since the firms’ willingness to pay
4Notable exceptions are the papers by Besanko and Kanatas (1993) and Rajan (1992).
5We are not aware of any empirical analysis that studies the influence of the project return
on the financing source.
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is increasing in the expected return of the project and decreasing in the success
probability we obtain the selection effects described above. These predictions
have not been obtained by the previous literature and to our knowledge there is
no empirical study that has compared the characteristics of projects that have
been financed by bank debt with those that were refused a credit. Subject to the
availability of detailed data on bank lending this would clearly be an interesting
research topic.
Our paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we set up the model and derive
first results concerning admissible contracts for the bank. The optimal contract
for the bank is determined in section 3, where we also discuss some extensions of
the model. We conclude the paper in section 4. All proofs are in the appendix.
2 The Model
There are three types of agents in our economy, investors, firms and a monopolis-
tic bank. There are two periods t = 0, 1, and there is one good (capital) in each
period. Firms seek finance for a risky project either at a bank or on the bond
market and we explicitly allow for a mix of financing source. Each project has a
fixed scale and requires an investment of one unit in t = 0. The returns of the
projects are realized in t = 1. Investors are the only agents who possess funds
in our economy. Thus, if the bank wants to give a credit to a firm, it first has
to raise funds from the investors. The precise characteristics of the agents are as
follows.
Investors: There is a continuum of identical investors with mass equal to 1.
Each investor has an endowment of one unit (of capital) in t = 0 and nothing in
t = 1. All consumption takes place at t = 1.6 Investors are risk-averse expected
utility maximizers and their preferences for consumption in t = 1 are represented
by the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function u(x) = ln(x) for x > 0.7 If
6That is, we assume that consumption in t = 0 is already completed.
7The results of this paper are not specific to logarithmic utility functions. The same im-
plications can be derived for the class of utility functions with constant relative risk aversion
(CRRA) ρ with 0 < ρ ≤ 1 and ρ sufficiently close to 1. The essential property that we need to
obtain the results of the paper is that the investment in the bond is increasing in the return it
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there is no bank and no bond market, any investor consumes her period zero
endowment in t = 1, i.e. we assume that there is a storage technology and that
capital is non-perishable.8
Firms: There is a continuum of firms that are owned and run by managers
who aim to maximize firms’ expected profits at t = 1. The mass of firms is 1
and hence equals the mass of investors. We can think of the firm as a start-up.
The manager has a project idea but no financial resources to realize the fixed
scale project, which requires an investment of one unit in t = 0. The manager
will only engage in the project if the expected profit covers his opportunity cost
K > 0. This participation constraint may, for example, reflect his opportunities
to work as an employee for some other firm instead of starting his own business.
We distinguish firms by the quality of their projects which we measure along
two dimensions, namely expected return and risk as reflected by the project’s
success probability (cf. Hellmann and Stiglitz, 2000). Hence, the type of a firm is
given by θ = (µ, σ) with µ ∈ R+, σ > 1, where 1/σ is the success probability and µ
is the expected return of the project. The return of a project with type θ = (µ, σ)
then is Q(θ) := σµ with probability p(θ) := 1/σ and 0 with probability 1− p(θ).
The distribution of project returns across firms with the same type θ is assumed
to satisfy a law of large numbers, i.e. there is no aggregate risk.9 Moreover, we
assume that the distribution of returns is independent across projects of different
types.
There is asymmetric information concerning the type of a firm which is only
known to the manager. Since the firm has no financial resources, collateral can-
not serve as a screening device between different projects as in Bester (1985).
delivers in the no-default state. As is well known, CRRA utility functions with 0 < ρ ≤ 1 have
this property.
8This assumption could easily be relaxed to allow for a positive depreciation rate without
any qualitative change of our results.
9Observe that there is no law of large numbers for a continuum of independent and identically
distributed random variables (see Judd, 1985, and Feldman and Gilles, 1985). On the other
hand, as Feldman and Gilles (1985) have shown, our distributional assumptions are innocuous.
There is a continuum of random variables, which are identically distributed according to the
distribution we have specified and which satisfy a law of large numbers. We merely have to
abandon independence, which is not needed for our results.
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Managers are not subject to moral hazard, though, i.e. they cannot choose the
quality of their project. Project returns are not publicly observable unless a firm
does not repay its debt and is declared bankrupt. Thus, ex post verification of
types is only possible in case of bankruptcy. We will come back to this point
when we discuss credit contracts.
We will assume that there are two types of firms in the economy, θ1 = (µ1, σ1)
and θ2 = (µ2, σ2), with corresponding proportions λ > 0 and 1− λ > 0 that are
common knowledge among all agents in the economy. Moreover, we assume that
µi −K > 1 for i = 1, 2,
i.e. that it is strictly efficient to carry out both projects. In the following let
pi = p(θ
i) = 1/σi and Qi = Q(θ
i) = σiµi for i = 1, 2.
Bank: The bank has no financial resources in either period and has to obtain
funds from investors in order to lend money to a firm. The bank is risk-neutral
and aims to maximize its expected period 1 profit from lending to firms and
borrowing from investors.
There are three assets that can be traded in our economy, a deposit contract,
a credit contract and a bond. There is restricted participation in these markets
and there are short selling constraints and buying floors which are different for the
different agents in our economy. In our simple model some of these constraints
cannot be obtained endogenously but they are exogenously justified.
Deposit Contract: A deposit contract is characterized by a safe return
rD ≥ 0 which is independent of the state of the world that is realized in t = 1,
i.e. independent of the failure of any firm’s project. Hence, rD − 1 is the interest
rate on deposits. Only the bank and the investors are allowed to trade in the
deposit contract and the bank is restricted to go short, while the investors are
restricted to go long in this contract. We will see later that the deposit contract
is indeed a safe asset, i.e. that the bank, by choosing interest rates and credit
volumes appropriately, returns rD almost surely.
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Credit Contract (Private Debt): A credit contract delivers the return
rC ≥ 0 in t = 1 if the debtor has enough funds to fulfill his obligations. Hence,
rC − 1 is the interest rate on credit. If the debtor does not repay the credit he
has to declare himself bankrupt at no cost and the bankrupt’s funds, if any, go
to the creditor. Thus, there is limited liability on the part of the debtor. Under
such a contractual arrangement the creditor has no incentive to declare himself
bankrupt if he has enough funds to repay his debt. Hence, if rC does not exceed
the project’s return in the good state, a credit contract will always deliver rC
or 0 depending on whether the project was successful or not. Observe that, as
we already mentioned above, ex post verification of returns is not possible since
there is no way to force a firm into bankruptcy unless it does not repay its credit.
Hence, a standard debt contract (cf. Gale and Hellwig, 1985) is the only feasible
contractual arrangement under limited liability and there is no way to screen the
firms using this instrument without driving one firm out of the market.
We restrict the bank to go long and the firms to go short in the credit contract
while investors are not allowed to trade in this contract.
Bond Contract (Public Debt): A bond contract is identical to a credit
contract except for different restrictions on market participation. Firms are re-
stricted to go short and investors are restricted to go long in the bond contract.
For ease of presentation we do not allow the bank to trade in bonds. This as-
sumption is innocuous since we would obtain the same results if the bank were
active on the bond market.10 The risky return of the bond contract in t = 1 is
denoted by rB ≥ 0, i.e. rB − 1 is the interest an investor receives for one unit of
bond if the project is successful.
The bank chooses the interest rate on deposits and on credit as well as the
credit volume C, where 0 ≤ C ≤ 1. In our model the bank does not set the
10It is straightforward to show that for any admissible contract (cf. Definition 2.1 and Defi-
nition 2.2) where the bank trades in bonds, there exists an admissible contract without trading
activity of the bank on the bond market such that the bank’s profit is the same. Hence, with-
out loss of generality, we can restrict to admissible contracts, where the bank does not trade in
bonds.
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deposit volume it is willing to accept, which again can be justified exogenously.11
All other agents act as price takers, i.e. investors take rD and rB as given and
choose the optimal portfolio of deposits and bonds and firms take as given rC
and rB and the credit volume C and choose the optimal financing strategies for
their projects. We will now analyze the optimization problems of the different
agents.
Optimization problem of a firm: Let the firm be of type θ = (µ, σ). Given
C, 0 ≤ C ≤ 1, rC ≥ 0, rB ≥ 0, the firm chooses whether to participate or not
and whether to accept the bank’s offer or else obtain all finance for the project
on the bond market. If C ≥ 0 is the amount of credit the firm borrows from the
bank and if B ≥ 0 is the amount of bonds it sells on the bond market, then its
expected period 1 profits are
Πθ =
{
p(θ)max{0, Q(θ)− CrC −BrB}, if C +B ≥ 1
0 , else
.
The firm will only participate if the expected profits cover its opportunity cost,
i.e. if Πθ ≥ K. The profit maximizing choice of the firm is independent of its
type and is given by
Cθ(C, rC , rB) =
{
C, if rB ≥ rC
0 , else
, Bθ(C, rC , rB) = 1− Cθ(C, rC , rB)
and the firm participates if and only if
p(θ)
(
Q(θ)− Cθ(C, rC , rB)rC −Bθ(C, rC , rB)rB) ≥ K
⇐⇒ µ− p(θ) (Cθ(C, rC , rB)rC +Bθ(C, rC , rB)rB) ≥ K.12
Since each type of firm is interested in minimizing the repayment in the good
state, Cθ(C, rC , rB)rC + Bθ(C, rC , rB)rB, and since this repayment is indepen-
dent of the type, the bank cannot separate types by offering two different credit
11We have in mind standard savings deposits here.
12To be precise, the maximizer of the expected profit function is not unique if profits are
never positive for the given (C, rC , rB). However, in this case, the firm will not participate
so there is no harm in selecting a particular maximizer then. Also, we assume that the firm
accepts the bank’s offer in case of indifference, i.e. whenever rB = rC . Introducing another tie
breaking rule would not change our result qualitatively as long as each firm accepts the bank’s
offer with a positive probability if rC = rB .
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contracts (C1, r
C
1 ) and (C2, r
C
2 ) so that each contract is chosen by exactly one
type. Indeed, if the bank would offer two different credit contracts (C1, r
C
1 ) and
(C2, r
C
2 ), then either both types would choose the same offer, or both would obtain
all finance on the bond market, or at least one type would not participate. Hence,
the bank cannot do better than by offering exactly one contract and the only way
it can separate the firms is by offering a credit contract that is acceptable to one
type only.
Optimization problem of an investor: Each investor can invest in de-
posits, yielding the riskless return rD, and in a bond, yielding the return rB
unless the firm that issued the bond is bankrupt. If rD < 1, an investor will
not invest into deposits but rather store her capital until period 1.13 Hence, the
bank will never offer rD < 1 and we will only consider the case rD ≥ 1 in the
following. The investor (knowing the firm’s participation constraint) correctly
anticipates that bankruptcy can only occur in case of a failure of the project.14
We assume that investors cannot diversify the risk at the bond market, i.e. there
is no “pooling security” as in Bisin and Gottardi (1999) and investors cannot
build a pooling bond by themselves, which is justified if pooling on a small scale
is too costly. Hence, risk pooling is provided by the bank in our model while
each investor buys bonds from one firm only. This assumption is crucial, but it
can be considerably weakened. Our results can be extended to the case where
investors can diversify their risk on the bond market to some extent as long as
full diversification is not possible. However, the analysis becomes more compli-
cated then without providing any new insights. Thus, for ease of presentation
we assume that investors cannot diversify their risk on the bond market at all.
This implies, in particular, that if both types of firms offer a bond, then chance
determines whether an investor obtains a type θ1 or a type θ2 bond.
Given her belief β about the proportion of type θ1 firms in the pool of firms
offering a bond contract, and taking as given rD ≥ 1 and rB ≥ 0 each investor
solves
13Recall that we assumed the depreciation rate to be zero.
14Recall from the optimization problem of a firm that it will only participate if expected
profits exceed K > 0, hence in equilibrium there is no bankruptcy in case of a success of the
project.
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max β
[
(1− p1)u(DrD) + p1u(DrD +BrB)
]
+(1− β) [(1− p2)u(DrD) + p2u(DrD +BrB)]
s.t. D,B ≥ 0 and D +B ≤ 1,
⇐⇒ max (1− p¯(β))u(DrD) + p¯(β)u(DrD +BrB)
s.t. D,B ≥ 0 and D +B ≤ 1,
where p¯(β) = βp1+(1−β)p2. Since u(x) = ln(x) is strictly monotone the investor
optimally chooses B = 1−D. From the first order condition, which is necessary
and sufficient for a maximum since u is strictly concave, we obtain
D(β, rB, rD) =
 (1− p¯(β))
rB
rB − rD , if p¯(β)r
B ≥ rD
1 , else
.
Hence, each investor always invests in the riskless deposit contract and she also
invests in the bond unless its expected return is smaller than the deposit return.
Admissible contracts for the bank: The bank is restricted to choose
(C, rC , rD) from a set of admissible contracts which can naturally be of two
types, pooling or screening. While both firm types obtain finance at the same
conditions in a pooling contract, a screening contract separates the firms so that
only one type obtains finance while the other does not participate. As we have
seen before, the latter is the only possibility to screen the firms. A contract is
admissible if it induces an equilibrium in the economy. In particular, there must
be market clearing on the bond market. The bank anticipates this equilibrium
and chooses a contract such as to maximize its expected period 1 profits.
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Definition 2.1 A contract (C, rC , rD) with 0 ≤ C ≤ 1 and rC ≥ 0, rD ≥ 1, is
an admissible pooling contract if there exists rB ≥ 0 and a belief β such that
(i) Cθ
i
(C, rC , rB) = C for i = 1, 2,
(ii) µi − pi
(
CrC + (1− C)rB) ≥ K for i = 1, 2,
(iii) β = λ,
(iv) 1−D(β, rB, rD) = 1− C.
Hence, (C, rC , rD) is an admissible pooling contract if both types of firms par-
ticipate and accept the contract (conditions (i) and (ii)), if the investors have
correct beliefs concerning the proportion of type θ1 firms on the bond market
(condition (iii)) and if there is market clearing on the bond market (condition
(iv)). Observe that the market clearing condition on the bond market implies
that C = D(β, rB, rD), i.e. the bank obtains enough funds in order to give credit
to the firms in period 0. The bank’s expected profit at an admissible pooling
contract (C, rC , rD) then is given by
ΓP (C, rC , rD) = C(p¯(λ)rC − rD).
Given our assumption that there is no aggregate risk, ΓP (C, rC , rD) is equal to
the average realized profit almost surely. Hence, whenever ΓP (C, rC , rD) ≥ 0, the
bank fulfills the deposit contract almost surely.
As we have discussed before, in a screening contract one type of firm is driven
out of the market.
Definition 2.2 A contract (C, rC , rD) with 0 ≤ C ≤ 1 and rC ≥ 0, rD ≥ 1, is
an admissible screening contract if for some i ∈ {1, 2} there exists rB ≥ 0
and a belief β such that
(i) Cθ
i
(C, rC , rB) = C,
(ii) µi − pi
(
CrC + (1− C)rB) ≥ K > µj − pj (CrC + (1− C)rB) for j 6= i,
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(iii) β =
{
1 , if i = 1
0 , else
,
(iv) 1−D(β, rB, rD) =
{
λ(1− C) , if i = 1
(1− λ)(1− C) , else .
Thus, (C, rC , rD) is an admissible screening contract if it is only accepted by a
firm of type θi, while type θj’s participation constrained is violated (conditions
(i) and (ii)), if the investors have correct beliefs concerning the proportion of type
θ1 firms on the bond market (condition (iii)) and if there is market clearing on
the bond market (condition (iv)). Again the market clearing condition on the
bond market implies that the bank gets enough deposits in order to give credit
to firms in period 0: If β is the corresponding correct belief of the investors, then
D(β, rB, rD)− βλC − (1− β)(1− λ)C = 1− βλ− (1− β)(1− λ) > 0.
The bank invests the amount of deposits that exceeds the credit volume in the
storage technology so that its expected profit at an admissible screening contract
(C, rC , rD) is given by
ΓS(C, rC , rD) = [βλp1 + (1− β)(1− λ)p2]CrC + 1− βλ− (1− β)(1− λ)
−D(β, rB, rD)rD.
If (C, rC , rD) is an admissible pooling (screening) contract and if rB ≥ 0 is
a corresponding equilibrium interest factor on the bond market (see Definitions
2.1 and 2.2), then we will call rB an interest factor on bonds supporting the
pooling (screening) contract (C, rC , rD). We will show below that the interest
factor rB supporting an admissible pooling or an admissible screening contract is
uniquely determined if the bank’s profit at this contract is nonnegative. However,
in general, it is possible that (C, rC , rD) is an admissible pooling as well as an
admissible screening contract, i.e. that there are two possible equilibria on the
bond market each corresponding to a different belief of the investors. In this case
there exist rB, r˜B with rB 6= r˜B, such that rB supports (C, rC , rD) as a pooling
contract and r˜B supports (C, rC , rD) as a screening contract as in the following
example.
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Example 2.1 Let θ1 = (11, 4) and θ2 = (11, 4/3), i.e. both projects have the
same expected return µ = 11, but project 1 is riskier than project 2 since p1 =
1/4 < p2 = 3/4. Moreover, let λ = 0.5 and K = 1. Then (C, r
C , rD) with
C = 20/37, rC = 40/3 and rD = 1 is an admissible pooling and an admissible
screening contract: rB = rC supports (C, rC , rD) as a pooling contract and r˜B =
38 supports (C, rC , rD) as a screening contract. We observe that ΓP (C, rC , rD) =
340/111 > ΓS(C, rC , rD) = 70/111.
We will see later under which conditions this multiplicity of equilibria can be
ruled out. There is also another possible type of multiplicity of equilibria on
the bond market: Let (C, rC , rD) be an admissible contract with C > 0. Then
we would like to rule out a market clearing interest rate factor rˆB on the bond
market such that rˆB < rC . If such an interest rate factor rˆB would exist, the
bank could not be sure which equilibrium would arise: the one with the interest
rate factor rB ≥ rC that supports (C, rC , rD) as a pooling or screening contract
or the interest rate factor rˆB which would lead to a closing down of the credit
market. The following lemma shows that this problem will never arise.
Lemma 2.1 Let (C, rC , rD) be an admissible pooling or screening contract with
C > 0. Then there exists no rˆB < rC that clears the bond market.
In the following we make some simple observations concerning the character-
istics of admissible pooling and screening contracts.
Lemma 2.2
(i) Let (C, rC , rD) be an admissible pooling contract with ΓP (C, rC , rD) ≥ 0.
Let β be the corresponding belief and rB the corresponding interest rate
factor on the bond market supporting (C, rC , rD). Then it is true that
C > 0, rB ≥ rC and p¯(β)rC ≥ rD,
where p¯(β) = βp1 + (1− β)p2.
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(ii) Let (C, rC , rD) be an admissible screening contract with ΓS(C, rC , rD) ≥ 0.
Let β be the corresponding belief and rB the corresponding interest rate
factor on the bond market supporting (C, rC , rD). If C > 0, then
p¯(β)rC ≥ rD and rB ≥ rC ,
where p¯(β) is defined as above.
The next lemma shows that the interest factor on bonds supporting an admis-
sible contract as a pooling, respectively screening contract, is uniquely determined
if the bank’s profit is nonnegative.
Lemma 2.3 Let (C, rC , rD) be an admissible pooling, respectively screening con-
tract with ΓP (C, rC , rD) ≥ 0, respectively ΓS(C, rC , rD) ≥ 0. Let rB and rˆB be two
interest factors on bonds, both supporting the contract (C, rC , rD) as a pooling,
respectively screening contract. Then rB = rˆB.
3 The Optimal Contract for the Bank
In the following we will determine the optimal contract for the bank. We start
by observing that for a profit maximizing contract (C, rC , rD) with C > 0 it must
be true that rB = rC , where rB is the interest rate factor on the bond market
supporting (C, rC , rD). This result is rather intuitive because if rB > rC , then
the bank can increase its profit by slightly increasing both the credit volume and
the interest rate on credit, leaving the firms’ profits unaffected. We state this
fact in the following lemma.
Lemma 3.1 Let (C, rC , rD) be an admissible pooling (screening) contract and let
rB support (C, rC , rD) as a pooling (screening) contract. Moreover, let
ΓP (C, rC , rD) ≥ 0 (ΓS(C, rC , rD) > 0). If rB > rC, then there exists an ad-
missible pooling (screening) contract (Cˆ, rˆC , rˆD) such that
ΓP (Cˆ, rˆC , rˆD) > ΓP (C, rC , rD) (ΓS(Cˆ, rˆC , rˆD) > ΓS(C, rC , rD)).
15
In order to determine the profit maximizing contract for the bank we proceed
in two steps. First, we determine the optimal pooling and the optimal screening
contract ignoring the possibility of multiple equilibria on the bond market. After-
wards we give conditions under which there is a unique equilibrium on the bond
market and we analyze whether the optimal pooling or the optimal screening
contract maximizes the bank’s profits. The profit maximizing pooling contract
solves
MaxC,rC ,rD Γ
P (C, rC , rD)
s.t. (C, rC , rD) is an admissible pooling contract.
We can restrict to those admissible pooling contracts that give the bank non-
negative profits.15 Then, by Lemma 2.2 and Lemma 3.1 we know that rB = rC ,
if rB supports the profit maximizing pooling contract (C, rC , rD). Hence, the
profit maximizing pooling contract for the bank is a solution to the following
optimization problem:
(P )
MaxrC ,rD F
P (rC , rD) := (1− p¯(λ)) r
C
rC − rD
(
p¯(λ)rC − rD)
s.t. p¯(λ)rC ≥ rD ≥ 1 and
rC ≤ mini=1,2{σi(µi −K)}
Since F P is decreasing in rD and increasing in rC we get the following result.
Theorem 3.1 (Profit Maximizing Pooling Contract) Let θ1 = (µ1, σ1) and
θ2 = (µ2, σ2). Then, there exists a solution to the bank’s optimization problem
(P) if and only if
p¯(λ) min
i=1,2
{σi(µi −K)} ≥ 1.
If this condition is satisfied, the solution to (P) is given by (rˆC , rˆD) with
rˆC = min
i=1,2
{σi(µi −K)}, rˆD = 1,
15If all admissible contracts give negative expected profits the bank will not participate and
hence receive zero profits.
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and the profit maximizing pooling contract is given by (Cˆ, rˆC , rˆD), with
Cˆ = (1− p¯(λ)) rˆ
C
rˆC − 1 .
There is trade on the bond market, i.e. Cˆ < 1, if and only if p¯(λ)rˆC > 1.
If we number types such that σ1(µ1−K) ≥ σ2(µ2−K), we see that in the profit
maximizing pooling contract all rents from a type θ2 firm but not necessarily all
rents from a type θ1 firm are absorbed. However, in general, not all rents go
to the bank. They are partly taken by the investors, since Cˆ = 1 if and only
if p¯(λ)mini=1,2{σi(µi − K)} = 1. Hence, generically, the bank’s preference for
high interest rates on credit will lead to the emergence of a bond market which
is rather intuitive: Given the preferences of the investors the bond market will
close down only if the interest rate on this market is very low. Since the interest
rate on bonds is positively correlated with the interest rate on credit (in fact they
are the same if the contract is chosen optimally) the bank has to put up with the
coexistence of the bond market if it wants keep interest rates high.
Next we determine the profit maximizing screening contract. The bank solves
MaxC,rC ,rD Γ
S(C, rC , rD)
s.t. (C, rC , rD) is an admissible screening contract.
Let θ1 = (µ1, σ1), θ
2 = (µ2, σ2) be such that
σ1(µ1 −K) > σ2(µ2 −K).
If θ1, θ2, do not satisfy this condition (possibly after renumbering), there does
not exist an admissible screening contract since condition (ii) in Definition 2.2 is
always violated. Hence, w.l.o.g. we will assume that the type θ2 firm will drop
out of the market if there is screening. This implies β = 1 for the correct belief
of the investors.
In order to rule out multiple equilibria on the bond market we will later
restrict the parameters of our model such that the best pooling contract always
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gives positive profits to the bank. Hence, in our search for a profit maximizing
screening contract we can restrict to those contracts that give positive expected
profits to the bank. By appealing to Lemma 2.2 and Lemma 3.1 we find the
profit maximizing screening contract as a solution to the following optimization
problem:
(S)
MaxrC ,rD F
S(rC , rD) := (1− p1) r
C
rC − rD
(
p1r
C − rD)+ (1− λ) (1− p1rC)
s.t. p1r
C ≥ rD ≥ 1 and
σ1(µ1 −K) ≥ rC > σ2(µ2 −K).
We obtain the following result.
Theorem 3.2 (Profit Maximizing Screening Contract) Let θ1 = (µ1, σ1)
and θ2 = (µ2, σ2) be such that σ1(µ1 −K) > σ2(µ2 −K), and let
r˜C =

σ1(µ1 −K) , if λ ≥ p1
min
{
1 +
1− p1√
p1(p1 − λ)
, σ1(µ1 −K)
}
, else
.
If r˜C > σ2(µ2−K), then the solution to (S) is given by (r˜C , r˜D) with r˜D = 1. In
this case the profit maximizing screening contract is (C˜, r˜C , r˜D) with
C˜ =
1
λ
(
(1− p1) r˜
C
r˜C − 1 − (1− λ)
)
< 1
and it yields strictly positive profits for the bank.
If r˜C ≤ σ2(µ2−K), then there exists no profit maximizing screening contract.
Again the bank’s profits are decreasing in rD so that it is optimal for the bank
to set r˜D = 1. However, contrary to the case of a pooling contract, profits are
not necessarily increasing in rC over the whole domain. Hence, the bank may
maximize profits at an intermediate interest rate on credit and the type θ1 firm
gets a positive rent. This will be the case if λ is sufficiently small. Then, the
increase in profit due to the increase in rC is too small to compensate for the
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decrease in the credit volume and hence the decrease in profit that is caused
by the reduction in the investors’ demand for deposits. If at the intermediate
interest rate the type θ2 firm would enter the market as well, there exists no profit
maximizing screening contract since the bank would like to charge an interest rate
factor rC arbitrary close to σ2(µ2 − K) in this case. Finally, we observe that,
whenever there exists a profit maximizing screening contract, then there is trade
on the bond market.
We now come back to the problem of multiplicity of equilibria on the bond
market. Obviously, the profit maximizing screening contract (C˜, r˜C , r˜D) can never
be an admissible pooling contract: Any admissible pooling contract has to satisfy
C > 0. If r˜B is the interest rate factor on bonds supporting (C˜, r˜C , r˜D) as a
screening contract, then any rˆB supporting this contract as a pooling contract
would have to satisfy rˆB > r˜C = r˜B since the firms accept Cˆ > 0 only if rˆB ≥ r˜C .
However, if rˆB > r˜C = r˜B, then the participation constraint of the type θ2 firm is
violated. On the contrary, Example 2.1 shows that the profit maximizing pooling
contract can be an admissible screening contract.16 If the bank proposes this
contract it may turn out that the resulting equilibrium on the bond market leads
to screening and gives the bank a lower profit than the best pooling contract. In
this case it is difficult to predict the bank’s behavior. Under a pessimistic attitude
the bank will never propose a pooling contract if this may result in a screening
equilibrium giving the bank a lower profit than the pooling equilibrium. On the
contrary, if the bank is optimistic, it will act as if there were no multiplicity of
equilibria believing that the pooling equilibrium will arise. Since it is not clear
whether one should assume an optimistic or pessimistic attitude on the part of
the bank we look for conditions on the parameters of our model under which there
exists a unique equilibrium on the bond market. The following lemma provides
such conditions.
16Observe that the contract in Example 2.1 is indeed the profit maximizing pooling contract
for the given parameters.
19
Lemma 3.2 Let θ1 = (µ1, σ1) and θ
2 = (µ2, σ2) be given with σ1(µ1 − K) >
σ2(µ2 − K). Let (Cˆ, rˆC , rˆD) be a profit maximizing pooling contract such that
ΓP (Cˆ, rˆC , rˆD) ≥ 0. If
σ1 = σ2 or σ1 ≤ 2σ2 µ2 −K
µ2 −K + 1 , (1)
then (Cˆ, rˆC , rˆD) is not an admissible screening contract.
The conditions in (1) are not only sufficient but also necessary to rule out
the multiplicity of equilibria for all λ for which the profit maximizing pooling
contract gives the bank a nonnegative profit. This is shown by the next lemma
(see also Example 2.1 where both conditions in (1) are violated).
Lemma 3.3 Let θ1 = (µ1, σ1) and θ
2 = (µ2, σ2) be given with σ1(µ1 − K) >
σ2(µ2 −K) and let
σ1 6= σ2 and σ1 > 2σ2 µ2 −K
µ2 −K + 1 .
If for some λ > 0 there exists a profit maximizing pooling contract (C, rC , rD)
with ΓP (C, rC , rD) ≥ 0, then there exists λˆ > 0 such that the corresponding profit
maximizing pooling contract (Cˆ, rˆC , rˆD) yields nonnegative profits and is also an
admissible screening contract.
In the following we will assume that one of the conditions in (1) is fulfilled so
that there is a unique equilibrium on the bond market. Let θ1 = (µ1, σ1), θ
2 =
(µ2, σ2) be given with σ1(µ1 − K) > σ2(µ2 − K) and let α1 = µ1 − K and
α2 = µ2 −K. From Theorem 3.1 and Theorem 3.2 we recall that
∗
Γ
P (λ) = (1− p¯(λ)) α2
α2 − p2
(
p¯(λ)
p2
α2 − 1
)
is the profit from the best pooling contract whenever this profit is nonnegative
and
∗
Γ
S(λ) = (p1r˜
C − 1)
(
(1− p1) r˜
C
r˜C − 1 − (1− λ)
)
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is the profit from the best screening contract whenever r˜C > σ2α2, where
r˜C =

σ1α1 , λ ≥ p1
min
{
1 +
1− p1√
p1(p1 − λ)
, σ1α1
}
, else
.
Moreover, from the proof of Theorem 3.2 we know that
∗
ΓS(λ) gives an upper
bound for the profit from a screening contract even if there exists no profit max-
imizing screening contract, i.e. if r˜C ≤ σ2α2. Comparing
∗
ΓS(λ) with
∗
ΓP (λ) then
gives the main result of our paper:
Theorem 3.3 (Optimal Contract) Let θ1 = (µ1, σ1) and θ
2 = (µ2, σ2) be
given with σ1(µ1 −K) > σ2(µ2 −K).
(i) If σ1 = σ2, then there exists 0 < λ
∗ < 1 such that the bank’s profits are
maximized at the profit maximizing pooling contract for λ ≤ λ∗ and at the
profit maximizing screening contract for λ ≥ λ∗.
(ii) If σ1 6= σ2 and σ1 ≤ 2σ2 µ2 −K
µ2 −K + 1 , then there exists 0 < λ
∗ < 1 such that
the bank’s profits are maximized at the profit maximizing pooling contract
for λ ≤ λ∗ and at a screening contract for λ ≥ λ∗. If µ1 −K > 1 is suffi-
ciently small, then for all λ ≥ λ∗ there exists a profit maximizing screening
contract.
The profit maximizing pooling and screening contracts are the contracts defined
in Theorem 3.1 and Theorem 3.2, respectively.
The theorem shows that the bank optimally chooses a pooling contract when-
ever the proportion of type θ1 firms is small while it optimally chooses a screening
contract whenever their proportion is large. Under a screening contract type θ2
firms drop out of the market and only type θ1 firms obtain finance. This result
is very intuitive. From our assumption that σ1(µ1 −K) > σ2(µ2 −K) it follows
that type θ1 firms are willing to pay a higher interest than type θ2 firms. Hence,
if the proportion of type θ1 firms is large, it pays to contract with these firms
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only by asking for an interest rate on credit that is too high for the type θ2 firms.
On the contrary, if the proportion of type θ1 firms is small it is better to keep
interest rates low and contract with all firms. Clearly, the details that lead to
this result are more involved as can be seen from the proof of Theorem 3.3 but
the main mechanism is the one described before.
As we have seen it is always the firm with the lower willingness to pay that
is driven out of the market under a screening contract. Since a firm’s willingness
to pay is given by σi(µi−K) there is a trade-off between the success probability
and the expected return that determines which firm is driven out of the market.
Hence, it is not clear whether the better or lower quality project obtains finance,
i.e. whether we have a positive or an adverse selection effect. Let us consider two
interesting extreme cases.
The case µ1 > µ2, σ1 = σ2: In this case the return distribution of type θ
1’s
project dominates the one of type θ2’s project in the sense of first order stochastic
dominance. Since the repayment probability is the same for both projects but
type θ1’s project delivers a higher expected return, firms with the high return
project are willing to pay a higher interest rate on credit than firms with the low
return project. Hence, there is a positive selection effect: We observe screening
if the proportion of good projects (high expected return) is large, in which case
the firms with low return projects drop out of the market.
The case µ1 = µ2, σ1 > σ2: In this case the return of type θ
1’s project
is a mean preserving spread of the return of type θ2’s project, i.e. the return
distribution of type θ2 dominates the one of type θ1 in the sense of second order
stochastic dominance. Since both projects have the same expected return but
type θ1 has a lower success and hence repayment probability than type θ2, firms
with the high risk project (type θ1) are willing to pay a higher interest rate on
credit than firms with the low risk project (type θ2). Hence, there is an adverse
selection effect: If the proportion of high risk projects is large, there is screening
and the low risks drop out of the market.
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In addition to the selection effects described above our results show that lower
quality projects obtain more capital from the bank relative to the bond market
than higher quality projects. From Theorem 3.3 and the characteristics of the
optimal screening and pooling contracts we obtain the following comparative
statics results.17
(i) In the region where pooling is the optimal choice for the bank (λ < λ∗), the
credit volume is increasing in the risk of type θ1’s project and it is decreasing
in the expected return of type θ2’s project.18 Moreover, the credit volume
is increasing in the proportion of the project with the higher risk, i.e. if
σ1 > σ2, then the credit volume is increasing in λ, and if σ1 < σ2, then the
credit volume is increasing in 1− λ.
(ii) In the region where screening is the optimal choice for the bank (λ ≥ λ∗)
and where µ1 − K is sufficiently small the credit volume is increasing in
the risk of the financed project and decreasing in its expected return. Also,
the credit volume is increasing in the proportion of the financed project.
Hence, if the financed project is the riskier one, then the bank allocates
more capital to this project if its proportion in the economy increases.
Hence, in a nutshell, the higher the risk of a project or the lower its expected
return, the more capital it obtains from the bank relative to the bond market.
The intuition for this result is very simple: The lower the expected return of a
project, the lower the interest rate on credit and bonds a firm is willing to pay. In
the presence of a riskless deposit contract a low interest rate on bonds decreases
the investors’ demand for bonds and hence increases the credit volume by the
market clearing condition. Similarly, a higher default risk on bonds decreases
the investors’ demand for bonds and therefore increases the credit volume. We
have seen that the bank’s preference for lower quality projects does not only
concern the credit volume but also the type of contract (pooling or screening)
that is chosen. Even though there can be a positive selection effect, where the low
17We have to restrict to local statements since we do not know how the credit volume in the
optimal pooling contract compares to the one in the optimal screening contract at the threshold
λ∗, where we have a change of regimes from pooling to screening.
18Observe that the credit volume is independent of the expected return of project 1.
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return project does not obtain finance, this positive selection is easily turned into
an adverse selection if the risk of the low return project becomes sufficiently large.
To see this observe that if µ1 < µ2 and σ1 is sufficiently large compared to σ2, then
type θ2 is driven out of the market. Thus, overall our results confirm the stylized
fact that bad risks obtain more finance from banks relative to bond markets than
good types. Our findings are natural in a context where a risk neutral bank
has to raise funds from risk averse investors whose demand for the safe deposit
increases with the riskiness of the bond and decreases with its return. This effect
is not captured in partial equilibrium models where it is usually assumed that
banks face an infinitely elastic supply of funds by investors at some exogenously
given interest rate. In our model the supply of funds varies with the types of
firms seeking finance on the bond and credit market and the bank takes this
into account when setting the credit volume and the interest rates. Hence, our
approach offers a new explanation for the stylized fact mentioned above and this
is the risk aversion of investors.
Observe that, by definition, in our model there is no credit rationing in equi-
librium (cf. Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). If at the given interest rates for a bank
credit and for bonds a firm is willing to obtain finance its demand is satisfied.
Even if the bank does not offer to finance the whole project, the remaining funds
can be raised on the competitive bond market, where interest rates adjust such
that demand equals supply.
3.1 Competitive Banking Sector
Although there is some empirical evidence of monopoly power at the level of
individual banks (see Cosimano and McDonald, 1998) it is important to note
that the results obtained in this paper are not driven by the monopoly power of
the bank. A full analysis of the competitive case clearly goes beyond the scope
of this paper. Nevertheless, we want to indicate why our results are quite robust
with respect to changes in the degree of competition in the banking sector.
Consider the case where there is competition between two banks. Obviously,
in equilibrium both banks must make zero profits. Moreover, since banks compete
for funds, the equilibrium interest rate on deposits will be maximal subject to the
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participation constraints of the firms and the zero profit condition of the banks.
Hence, in a pooling equilibrium the maximal interest rate factor that banks can
pay is given by r∗D = p¯(λ)σ2(µ2 − K) since r∗C = σ2(µ2 − K) is the maximal
interest rate factor on credit that type θ2 firms are willing to pay. One can show
that banks can pay a higher interest rate on deposits under pooling than under
screening if λ is small. For λ large screening allows for a higher interest rate than
pooling. Hence, we obtain the same selection effects as in the monopoly case:
for λ small there will be a pooling equilibrium and for λ large there will be a
screening equilibrium.
Concerning changes in the credit volume with respect to changes in risk and
return of the financed projects we first observe that there is no trade on the bond
market if the economy is in a pooling equilibrium. This follows from the fact
that investors invest all their capital at the bank if r∗D = p¯(λ)r∗B.19 Hence,
in a pooling equilibrium firms obtain all their finance from the bank and the
credit volume is invariant with respect to changes in risk and return. In case of a
screening equilibrium, however, there is trade on the bond market. For the same
reason as in the monopoly case the credit volume is decreasing in the expected
return and increasing in the proportion of the financed project. Moreover, for
a broad range of parameters the credit volume is increasing in the risk of the
financed projects.
3.2 Screening of Projects
In our model firms have no capital, so that the bank can only use interest rates
to screen the projects. As we have seen, in this case screening necessarily drives
one firm type out of the market. In the following we briefly discuss the effect
of introducing internal firm capital which allows for collateral to be used as an
additional contractual instrument for screening projects. We will provide an
informal and intuitive argument for why we expect that the main insight of
our benchmark model remains true in this extended model, namely that lower
quality projects receive more finance from the bank relative to the bond market
19As in the monopolistic bank case one can show that in equilibrium the interest rate on
bonds equals the interest rate on credit, i.e. r∗B = r∗C .
25
than higher quality projects.
Consider a situation, where firms have some capital A > 0 which is not suf-
ficient to self-finance the project, i.e. A < 1. For simplicity suppose that firms
differ only with respect to the success probability of their projects, i.e. there is
a high risk and a low risk type with success probability 1/σH and 1/σL, respec-
tively, where σH > σL. In addition to setting the credit volume and interest rate
on credit the bank can now ask for a collateral S ∈ [0, A] to be paid in case
the financed project is not successful. Clearly, with a positive collateral for bank
credit the interest rate on bonds has to be larger than the interest rate on credit.
Otherwise firms would obtain all finance from the bond market. Also, the high
risk type firm suffers more from an increase in collateral than the low risk type
firm and hence, for any given credit volume, the high risk firm requires a larger
decrease in the interest rate on credit than the low risk firm for any marginal in-
crease in collateral. Suppose now that the bank offers the same contract (S,C, rC)
to all firms. Then it can improve by offering an additional contract (SH , C, rCH)
with SH < S and rCH > rC which will be preferred to the original contract by
the high risk type only. Then, in order to satisfy the market clearing condition
on the bond market, the bank has to increase the credit volume it offers to the
high risk firm, i.e. CH > C. To see this observe that a decrease in collateral
decreases the supply of bonds. One way to restore market clearing then is to
increase the credit volume for the high risk type which further decreases the sup-
ply for bonds but at the same time lowers the default risk on the bond market
and hence increases the demand for bonds. Given these observations we conjec-
ture that the bank maximizes profits by offering a menu of separating contracts
(SH , CH , rCH), (SL, CL, rCL) with SH < SL, CH > CL and rCH > rCL such that
the high risk type chooses the contract with low collateral, large credit volume
and large interest rate, while the low risk type prefers the contract with high
collateral, small credit volume and low interest rate. Moreover, we conjecture
that the total credit volume is decreasing in the expected return of the projects
(which is assumed to be the same for both firm types) for the same reason as
in our benchmark model: An increase in the expected return allows for higher
interest rates on credit which will drive up the interest rate on bonds and hence
increases the demand for bonds. Market clearing then requires that the credit
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volume must decrease.
Summarizing, as in our benchmark model without internal firm capital we
expect to see more bank finance relative to the bond market for high risk and low
return projects. A rigorous analysis which requires more subtle arguments than
the ones we have provided above is left for future research.
4 Conclusion
We have presented a simple model of a closed economy where a bank competes
with a bond market on both sides of its balance sheet: consumers can invest their
capital in risky bonds and in safe deposits and firms can issue bonds and obtain
a bank credit. Therefore, when setting the credit volume and the interest rates,
the bank has to take into account the resulting equilibrium on the bond market.
In particular, the bank does not face an infinitely elastic supply of funds at an
exogenously given interest rate as it is commonly assumed in the literature.
Different from most models on direct versus intermediated finance in the lit-
erature our results predict a mix of financing source, i.e. neither the bank nor the
bond market has its own clientele. This is confirmed by several empirical studies
showing that a large fraction of firms has a mix of bank and public debt out-
standing (Houston and James, 1996, Johnson, 1997), i.e. bank lending remains
an important source of finance even if firms have access to public debt markets.
Moreover, we have seen that the credit volume is increasing in the default risk
and decreasing in the expected return of the financed projects. This provides a
new explanation for the fact that banks allocate more capital to lower quality
projects. Unlike earlier work, which has focused on monitoring and relationship
banking, our results are driven by the risk aversion of investors and the bank’s
ability to diversify risk. We do not claim that the monitoring or relationship
aspect of banking is not important in explaining the allocation of capital across
risky projects. Instead, we want to point out that there is an additional, much
simpler explanation, which does not appeal to very sophisticated bank services
like monitoring or contract renegotiation and which seems to have been over-
looked so far. Risk aversion is a predominant phenomenon and it should come at
no surprise that it has significant influence on the allocation of capital and risk
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in an economy.
Our model also has interesting implications for the case where the propor-
tion of the high risk and/or high expected return project gets large. In this
case we have seen that there will be a screening equilibrium with adverse selec-
tion, whenever firms only differ in the default risk, and a screening equilibrium
with positive selection, whenever firms only differ in the expected return of their
projects. Putting this prediction to an empirical test could be very insightful
since other theoretical models have not produced similar results.20
It would be desirable to distinguish empirically our explanation for the role
of banks in project financing from other explanations that have been provided in
the literature. However, hard evidence on the relative importance of monitoring,
relationship banking and risk diversification may be difficult if not impossible to
obtain, so the best we can do is to test the predictions of the theoretical models.
In this respect, as we have seen, our model performs very well.
A Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 2.1: Let (C, rC , rD) be an admissible contract with C > 0 and
let rB ≥ rC be the interest rate factor on the bond market supporting (C, rC , rD)
as a pooling or screening contract. Suppose by way of contradiction that rˆB < rC
clears the bond market as well. If (C, rC , rD) is an admissible pooling contract it
follows that given rˆB both types of firms will reject the bank’s offer and demand
one unit of capital on the bond market. Hence, for the bond market to clear each
investor has to invest all his capital on the bond market which he will never do
given his preferences as we have seen before.
It remains to consider the case where (C, rC , rD) is an admissible screening
contract. W.l.o.g. let it be the type θ1 firm that participates at this contract.
If rˆB < rC then either both types of firms will participate and reject the bank’s
offer leading to the same contradiction as above. Or else only the type θ1 firm
participates. But then the bond market cannot clear at the interest rate factor
rˆB since it cleared at rB ≥ rC : the type θ1 firm demands more capital on the
bond market at rˆB while the investors will invest less capital than at rB.
¤
20Such a test would require detailed data about bank lending, which may not be easily
available. 28
Proof of Lemma 2.2:
(i) Let (C, rC , rD) be an admissible pooling contract and let β be the corre-
sponding belief of the investors and rB the interest rate factor on bonds
supporting (C, rC , rD). Then β = λ and C > 0 immediately follows from
the market clearing condition and the fact that D(β, rB, rD) > 0. This im-
plies rB ≥ rC from the optimization problem of the firms. If, in addition,
ΓP (C, rC , rD) = C(p¯(λ)rC−rD) ≥ 0, then it follows that p¯(λ)rC ≥ rD since
C > 0.
(ii) Let (C, rC , rD) be an admissible screening contract and let β be the cor-
responding belief of the investors and rB the interest rate factor on bonds
supporting (C, rC , rD). W.l.o.g. let β = 1. From the market clearing con-
dition on the bond market (condition (iv) of Definition 2.2) it follows that
D(β, rB, rD) = 1− λ(1− C).
Hence, ΓS(C, rC , rD) = λC
(
p1r
C − rD)+ (1− λ)(1− rD) ≥ 0 immediately
implies that p1r
C ≥ rD if C > 0 since rD ≥ 1. rB ≥ rC follows as above.
Since p¯(β) = p1 this proves our lemma.
¤
Proof of Lemma 2.3: Let rB and rˆB be two interest factors on bonds
supporting the admissible contract (C, rC , rD) and let β be the corresponding
belief of the investors. Observe that independently of rB it is always the same
firm that is driven out of the market. Let ΓP (C, rC , rD) ≥ 0, respectively
ΓS(C, rC , rD) ≥ 0. Consider first the case where C > 0. Then, by Lemma
2.2 it follows that rB ≥ rC , rˆB ≥ rC , p¯(β)rB ≥ rD and p¯(β)rˆB ≥ rD. Since
D(β, rB, rD) = D(β, rˆB, rD) by the market clearing condition (iv) in Definitions
2.1 and 2.2, it then follows that
D(β, rB, rD) = (1− p¯(β)) r
B
rB − rD = (1− p¯(β))
rˆB
rˆB − rD = D(β, rˆ
B, rD).
Since rD ≥ 1 this implies rB = rˆB.
It remains to consider the case where C = 0. By Lemma 2.2 this can only be
the case if (C, rC , rD) is a screening contract. By the market clearing condition
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(iv) in Definition 2.2 it follows that D(β, rB, rD) = D(β, rˆB, rD) = 1− βλ− (1−
β)(1− λ) < 1. Hence, as above we conclude that rB = rˆB.
¤
Proof of Lemma 3.1: Let (C, rC , rD) be an admissible pooling (screening)
contract and let β be the corresponding belief of the investors and rB the interest
rate factor on the bond market supporting (C, rC , rD) as a pooling (screening)
contract. By Lemma 2.2 we know that C > 0, rB ≥ rC and p¯(β)rC ≥ rD since
ΓP (C, rC , rD) ≥ 0, respectively ΓS(C, rC , rD) > 0. (Observe that ΓS(C, rC , rD) >
0 implies that C > 0.) Hence D(β, rB, rD) = (1− p¯(β)) r
B
rB − rD follows from the
optimization problem of the investors. Now suppose rB > rC . Then C < 1 since
C = 1 would imply D(β, rB, rD) = 1 and hence rD = p¯(β)rB > p¯(β)rC ≥ rD
which is impossible. We define
rˆC = CrC + (1− C)rB.
Then, obviously, rB > rˆC > rC . Let rˆB = rˆC . We will now consider separately
the cases of a pooling and a screening contract.
Pooling: If (C, rC , rD) is an admissible pooling contract, it follows that β = λ
by condition (iii) of a pooling contract. Then, by definition, p¯(λ)rˆB > p¯(λ)rC ≥
rD which implies
D(λ, rˆB, rD) = (1− p¯(λ)) rˆ
B
rˆB − rD > (1− p¯(λ))
rB
rB − rD = C
since (1− p¯(λ)) r
B
rB − rD is decreasing in r
B. Let Cˆ = D(λ, rˆB, rD) and rˆD = rD.
Then, Cˆ > C and we will show that (Cˆ, rˆC , rˆD) is an admissible pooling contract
supported by rˆB and that ΓP (Cˆ, rˆC , rˆD) > ΓP (C, rC , rD). To this end let β = λ
be the correct belief of the investors. Since rˆB = rˆC we get Cθ
i
(Cˆ, rˆC , rˆB) = Cˆ
for i = 1, 2, so that condition (i) of an admissible pooling contract is satisfied.
Moreover, for i = 1, 2,
µi − pi
(
CˆrˆC + (1− Cˆ)rˆB
)
= µi − pirˆC
= µi − pi
(
CrC + (1− C)rB) ≥ K,
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by definition of rˆC so that the participation constrained (ii) is satisfied. Condi-
tions (iii) and (iv) are fulfilled by definition. Finally,
ΓP (Cˆ, rˆC , rˆD) = Cˆ
(
p¯(λ)rˆC − rˆD) > C (p¯(λ)rC − rD) = ΓP (C, rC , rD).
Screening: We only consider the case where β = 1 is the belief of the
investors corresponding to the admissible screening contract (C, rC , rD). This
implies p¯(β) = p1. From p1rˆ
B > p1r
C ≥ rD it follows that D(1, rˆB, rD) =
(1 − p1) rˆ
B
rˆB − rD > (1 − p1)
rB
rB − rD = D(1, r
B, rD) by the same monotonicity
argument as above. Also, from condition (iv) of an admissible screening contract
it follows that D(1, rB, rD) = 1− λ(1−C) > 1− λ so that D(1, rˆB, rD) > 1− λ.
We define
Cˆ =
D(1, rˆB, rD)− (1− λ)
λ
and will argue that (Cˆ, rˆC , rˆD) with rˆD = rD is an admissible screening contract
that strictly increases the bank’s profit over the contract (C, rC , rD). To this
end let β = 1 be the correct belief of the investors. Since rˆB = rˆC we get
Cθ
1
(Cˆ, rˆC , rˆB) = Cˆ, so that condition (i) of an admissible screening contract is
satisfied. Moreover,
µ1 − p1
(
CˆrˆC + (1− Cˆ)rˆB
)
= µ1 − p1rˆC
= µ1 − p1
(
CrC + (1− C)rB)
≥ K
> µ2 − p2
(
CrC + (1− C)rB)
= µ2 − p2rˆC
= µ2 − p2
(
CˆrˆC + (1− Cˆ)rˆB
)
by definition of rˆC so that condition (ii) is satisfied. Conditions (iii) and (iv) are
fulfilled by definition. Finally,
ΓS(C, rC , rD) = λp1Cr
C + 1− λ−D(1, rB, rD)rD
=
(
D(1, rB, rD)− (1− λ)) p1rC + 1− λ−D(1, rB, rD)rD
= D(1, rB, rD)
(
p1r
C − rD)+ (1− λ)(1− p1rC)
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< D(1, rˆB, rˆD)
(
p1r
C − rˆD)+ (1− λ)(1− p1rC)
< D(1, rˆB, rˆD)
(
p1rˆ
C − rˆD)+ (1− λ)(1− p1rˆC)
= ΓS(Cˆ, rˆC , rˆD),
where the second equality follows from the market clearing condition on the
bond market and the last inequality follows from the fact that rˆC > rC and
D(1, rˆB, rˆD) > 1− λ.
¤
Proof of Theorem 3.1: The necessity and sufficiency of the condition
p¯(λ)mini=1,2{σi(µi − K)} ≥ 1 immediately follows from the constraints of the
optimization problem (P). Now let this condition be satisfied. Then we compute
∂
∂rC
F P (rC , rD) =
1− p¯(λ)
(rC − rD)2
(
p¯(λ)(rC)2 − 2p¯(λ)rCrD + (rD)2)
which is easily seen to be positive for all rC ≥ 0, rD ≥ 1, since p¯(λ) < 1. Also
∂
∂rD
F P (rC , rD) = −(1− p¯(λ))2 (r
C)2
(rC − rD)2
which is negative for all rC ≥ 0, rD ≥ 1 since p¯(λ) < 1. Hence, the solution to (P)
is given by rˆC = mini=1,2{σi(µi−K)}, rˆD = 1. Since F P (rˆC , rˆD) is the maximum
profit the bank can achieve with a pooling contract, the optimal pooling contract
is given by (Cˆ, rˆC , rˆD) with Cˆ = (1− p¯(λ)) rˆ
C
rˆC − 1. Obviously, Cˆ < 1 if and only
if p¯(λ)rˆC > 1.
¤
Proof of Theorem 3.2: Let p1r
C ≥ rD ≥ 1. Then
∂
∂rD
F S(rC , rD) = −(1− p1)2 (r
C)2
(rC − rD)2 < 0
which implies that F S(rC , rD) is maximized for r˜D = 1. Hence, it remains to
solve the following optimization problem
MaxrC F
S(rC , 1) = (p1r
C − 1)
(
(1− p1) r
C
rC − 1 − (1− λ)
)
s.t. p1r
C ≥ 1 and
σ1(µ1 −K) ≥ rC > σ2(µ2 −K).
(2)
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We compute
∂
∂rC
F S(rC , 1) =
1− p1
(rC − 1)2
(
p1(r
C)2 − 2p1rC + 1
)− (1− λ)p1 (3)
and
∂2
∂(rC)2
F S(rC , 1) < 0 since rC > 1. Hence, F S(rC , 1) is strictly concave in
rC for rC with p1r
C ≥ 1. From (3) it follows that ∂
∂rC
F S(rC , 1) > 0 for all rC if
λ ≥ p1. In this case the solution to (2) is given by r˜C = σ1(µ1 −K).
If λ < p1, then for r
C with p1r
C ≥ 1, ∂
∂rC
F S(rC , 1) > 0 if and only if rC <
1 + (1− p1)/
√
p1(p1 − λ). Hence, the solution to (2) is given by
r˜C = min
{
1 +
1− p1√
p1(p1 − λ)
, σ1(µ1 −K)
}
whenever r˜C > σ2(µ2 −K). In this case let
C˜ =
1
λ
(
(1− p1) r˜
C
r˜C − 1 − (1− λ)
)
.
Since p1r˜
C > 1 it follows that
∂
∂λ
F S(r˜C , 1) = p1r˜
C − 1 > 0.
Moreover, limλ→0 F S(r˜C , 1) = 0. Together this implies F S(r˜C , 1) > 0 for all
λ > 0. Hence, (C˜, r˜C , r˜D) is the profit maximizing screening contract and it
yields strictly positive profits for the bank.
If r˜C ≤ σ2(µ2 −K) there exists no solution to (2) and hence no profit maxi-
mizing screening contract.
¤
Proof of Lemma 3.2: Let (C, rC , rD) be an admissible pooling contract
with p¯(λ)rC ≥ rD. Let rB be the interest rate factor supporting (C, rC , rD) as a
pooling contract and let r˜B be the interest rate factor supporting (C, rC , rD) as
a screening contract. Then r˜B > rB and
C = (1− p¯(λ)) r
B
rB − rD =
1
λ
(
(1− p1) r˜
B
r˜B − rD − (1− λ)
)
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by the market clearing conditions in the definition of an admissible pooling and
screening contract. This implies
λC <
1− p1
1− p¯(λ)C − (1− λ)
⇐⇒ 1− λ < C 1− p1 − λ(1− p¯(λ))
1− p¯(λ) . (4)
Now let (Cˆ, rˆC , rˆD) be a profit maximizing pooling contract with
ΓP (Cˆ, rˆC , rˆD) ≥ 0. In order to show that (Cˆ, rˆC , rˆD) is not an admissible screen-
ing contract it suffices to show that Cˆ violates (4). Let α2 = µ2 − K. Since
p¯(λ)rˆC ≥ rˆD (nonnegative profits of the bank) we can apply the argument above.
Consider first the case where σ1 = σ2. Then p1 = p2 = p¯(λ) for all λ and (4)
transforms to
1− λ < Cˆ (1− p1)(1− λ)
1− p1
which is impossible since Cˆ ≤ 1.
Now consider the case where σ1 6= σ2 and σ1 ≤ 2σ2 α2
α2 + 1
. By Theorem 3.1
we know that Cˆ = (1− p¯(λ)) α2
α2 − p2 . Using this expression (4) is equivalent to
α2(p1 − p2)
(
λ2 − λ p2(1− α2)
α2(p1 − p2) +
p2 − α2p1
α2(p1 − p2)
)
> 0. (5)
If p1 > p2, then (5) is violated for all λ with
p2 − α2p1
α2(p1 − p2) ≤ λ ≤ 1.
Since p¯(λ)rˆC ≥ rˆD = 1 one immediately verifies that (5) is indeed violated for
the given λ, i.e. (Cˆ, rˆC , rˆD) is not an admissible screening contract.
If p1 < p2, then (5) is violated for all λ ≤ 1. Hence, as in the previous case
we have proved that (Cˆ, rˆC , rˆD) is not an admissible screening contract.
¤
Proof of Lemma 3.3: Define α1 = µ1 − K and α2 = µ2 − K. Under the
assumptions in the statement of the Lemma let (Cˆ, rˆC , rˆD) be a profit maximiz-
ing pooling contract for some λˆ > 0 such that ΓP (Cˆ, rˆC , rˆD) ≥ 0. Let rB be
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the interest rate factor on the bond market supporting (Cˆ, rˆC , rˆD) as a pool-
ing contract. From Theorem 3.1 we know that rB = rˆC = α2/p2, rˆ
D = 1, and
Cˆ = (1− p¯(λˆ)) α2
α2 − p2 . Then, (Cˆ, rˆ
C , rˆD) is also an admissible screening contract
if and only if there exists rˆB > rB such that
Cˆ =
1
λˆ
(
(1− p1) rˆ
B
rˆB − rD − (1− λˆ)
)
(6)
and CˆrˆC + (1− Cˆ)rˆB ≤ σ1α1. (7)
From equation (6) it follows that rˆB > rB if and only if
λˆCˆ <
1− p1
1− p¯(λˆ)Cˆ − (1− λˆ) (8)
⇐⇒ α2(p1 − p2)
(
λˆ2 − λˆ p2(1− α2)
α2(p1 − p2) +
p2 − α2p1
α2(p1 − p2)
)
> 0. (9)
Also, from equation (6) it follows that
rˆB =
λˆCˆ + 1− λˆ
λˆCˆ + p1 − λˆ
(10)
Case 1: p1 > p2
Let (C, rC , rD) be a profit maximizing pooling contract for some λ > 0 such
that ΓP (C, rC , rD) ≥ 0. Since p1 > p2 it follows that p¯(λ) is increasing in λ.
Hence, for all λˆ ≥ λ there exists a profit maximizing pooling contract giving the
bank a nonnegative profit. One verifies that the inequality in (9) is satisfied for all
λˆ under the conditions of the lemma and given that p1 > p2. Moreover, from (10)
and Cˆ → (1− p1)α2/(α2 − p2) for λˆ→ 1, it follows that rˆB → α2/p2 for λˆ→ 1.
Hence, rˆB < α1/p1 if λˆ is close to 1 since by assumption α2/p2 < α1/p1. Choose
λˆ such that the corresponding rˆB as defined in (10) satisfies rˆB < α1/p1 and let
(Cˆ, rˆC , rˆD) be the profit maximizing pooling contract for λˆ. Our arguments show
that (6) and (7) are satisfied so that (Cˆ, rˆC , rˆD) is also an admissible screening
contract.
Case 2: p1 < p2
Let (C, rC , rD) be a profit maximizing pooling contract for some λ > 0 such
that ΓP (C, rC , rD) ≥ 0. It is straightforward to see that the inequality in (9) is
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satisfied for all λˆ such that λ1 < λˆ < 1, where
λ1 =
α2p1 − p2
α2(p2 − p1) .
Consider first the case where λ1 ≥ 0. Then p¯(λˆ)rˆC = p¯(λˆ)α2/p2 ≥ 1 for all λˆ,
where (Cˆ, rˆC , rˆD) is the corresponding profit maximizing pooling contract. Hence,
as above we can choose λˆ close to 1 such that rˆB < α1/p1 and the corresponding
profit maximizing pooling contract gives nonnegative profits and is an admissible
screening contract.
Consider now the case where λ1 < 0. Then the inequality in (9) is fulfilled for
all λˆ. Since p¯(λ)rC = p¯(λ)α2/p2 ≥ 1, p¯(λ) is decreasing in λ (because p1 < p2)
and p¯(1)α2/p2 < 1 (because λ1 < 0), it follows that there exists λˆ ≥ λ such that
p¯(λˆ)α2/p2 = 1. Hence, for the corresponding profit maximizing pooling contract
(Cˆ, rˆC , rˆD) it is true that Cˆ = 1 and therefore
CˆrˆC + (1− Cˆ)rˆB = rˆC = α2/p2 < α1/p1.
Thus, again (6) and (7) are satisfied, i.e. (Cˆ, rˆC , rˆD) is an admissible screening
contract.
¤
Proof of Theorem 3.3: Let θ1 = (µ1, σ1) and θ
2 = (µ2, σ2) be given with
σ1(µ1 −K) > σ2(µ2 −K). Define α1 = µ1 −K and α2 = µ2 −K. Then
∗
Γ
P (λ) = (1− p¯(λ)) α2
α2 − p2
(
p¯(λ)
p2
α2 − 1
)
is the profit at the best pooling contract whenever this profit is nonnegative and
∗
Γ
S(λ) = (p1r˜
C − 1)
(
(1− p1) r˜
C
r˜C − 1 − (1− λ)
)
is the profit from the best screening contract whenever r˜C > σ2α2, where
r˜C =
 σ1α1 , λ ≥ p1min{1 + 1−p1√
p1(p1−λ)
, σ1α1
}
, else
. (11)
Moreover, from the proof of Theorem 3.2 we know that
∗
ΓS(λ) gives an upper
bound for the profit from a screening contract also in the case where r˜C ≤ σ2α2.
36
Since
p¯(λ)
p2
α2 ≥ min{p1, p2}
p2
α2 > 1
for all λ whenever σ1 = σ2 or σ1 6= σ2 and σ1 ≤ 2σ2 α2
α2 + 1
, it follows that
∗
ΓP (λ) > 0 is bounded away from 0 for all λ > 0. Hence, from limλ→0
∗
ΓS(λ) = 0
we conclude that
∗
ΓS(λ) <
∗
ΓP (λ) if λ is sufficiently small. Moreover,
lim
λ→1
∗
Γ
S(λ) = (1− p1) α1
α1 − p1 (α1 − 1) and
lim
λ→1
∗
Γ
P (λ) = (1− p1) α2
α2 − p2
(
p1
p2
α2 − 1
)
.
Hence, limλ→1
∗
ΓS(λ) > limλ→1
∗
ΓP (λ) if and only if
α1
α1 − p1 (α1 − 1) >
α2
α2 − p2
(
p1
p2
α2 − 1
)
. (12)
The right hand side of this inequality is easily seen to be increasing in α2. Since
by assumption σ1α1 > σ2α2 it follows that α2 < α1p2/p1 and therefore (12) is
satisfied.
We further observe that
∗
ΓP (λ) is a concave function in λ while
∗
ΓS(λ) is an
increasing convex function in λ since
d
dλ
∗
Γ
S(λ) = p1r˜
C − 1
is positive (r˜C > σ1) and nondecreasing in λ because r˜
C is nondecreasing in λ.
Consider the following cases.
(i) Let σ1 = σ2 = σ and p = 1/σ. Then
∗
ΓP (λ) is constant while
∗
ΓS(λ) is
strictly increasing in λ. Hence from our observations above it follows that
there exists a unique λ∗, 0 < λ∗ < 1, such that
∗
Γ
P (λ)
>
=
<
∗
Γ
S(λ) if and only if λ
<
=
>
λ∗.
It remains to show that there exists a profit maximizing screening contract
for λ > λ∗. From the definition of r˜C in (11) it follows that r˜C → σ < σα2
for λ → 0. Hence, there exists λ0 such that r˜C = σα2 and there exists a
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profit maximizing screening contract if and only if λ > λ0. We will show
that λ∗ > λ0 for the intersection point λ∗ between
∗
ΓP (λ) and
∗
ΓS(λ).
∗
Γ
S(λ0) = (α2 − 1)
(
(1− p) α2
α2 − p − (1− λ
0)
)
,
∗
Γ
P (λ0) = (1− p) α2
α2 − p(α2 − 1.)
Hence,
∗
ΓP (λ0) >
∗
ΓS(λ0), i.e. λ∗ > λ0.
(ii) Let σ1 6= σ2 and σ1 ≤ 2σ2 α2
α2 + 1
. As we have noted above,
∗
ΓS(λ) is convex
in λ. Since σ1 6= σ2 it follows that
∗
ΓP (λ) is strictly concave in λ. Hence,
from limλ→1
∗
ΓS(λ) > limλ→1
∗
ΓP (λ) and limλ→0
∗
ΓS(λ) < limλ→0
∗
ΓP (λ) it
follows that there exists a unique λ∗, 0 < λ∗ < 1, such that
∗
Γ
P (λ)
>
=
<
∗
Γ
S(λ) if and only if λ
<
=
>
λ∗.
Thus, the bank’s profits are maximized at a pooling contract for λ ≤ λ∗ and
at a screening contract for λ ≥ λ∗. It remains to show that there exists a
profit maximizing screening contract for λ ≥ λ∗ whenever α1 is sufficiently
small.
There exists a profit maximizing screening contract for λ ≥ p1 since in this
case r˜C = σ1α1 > σ2α2 for r˜
C as defined in (11). Hence, to prove our
claim it is sufficient to show that
∗
ΓP (p1) >
∗
ΓS(p1). Provided that α1 is
sufficiently small this immediately follows from
∗
Γ
S(p1) = p1(1− p1) α1 − 1
α1 − p1 ,
∗
Γ
P (p1) = (1− p¯(p1)) α2
α2 − p2
(
p¯(p1)
p2
α2 − 1
)
since (α1 − 1)/(α1 − p1) is increasing in α1. This concludes the proof.
¤
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